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                                                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL   
     
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1103 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
STEVEN MENSAH-YAWSON, 
            Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Western Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-09-cr-00276-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Gary L. Lancaster 
______ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 19, 2012 
 
Before: AMBRO, and VANASKIE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed June 20, 2012) 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Steven Mensah-Yawson appeals his judgment of conviction after being 
found guilty by a jury of conspiring to commit an offense involving counterfeit securities.  
He claims his rights to a speedy trial, provided in both the Speedy Trial Act (―STA‖), 18 
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U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, were 
violated.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 We write for the benefit of the parties and recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition.  Mensah-Yawson and three codefendants (Stacy Nicholas, James Greer, and 
Daniel Poole) were charged on September 15, 2009 by a grand jury sitting in the Western 
District of Pennsylvania with conspiring to commit an offense against the United States 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  Specifically, the individuals were charged with 
conspiring to make, utter, and possess counterfeit securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
513(a).  Mensah-Yawson was arraigned on October 20, 2009.  He waived his detention 
hearing, and thus remained in custody while Poole and Nicholas were released on bond.  
On the same day Mensah-Yawson was arraigned, his codefendant Nicholas filed a 
motion to extend the time for filing pretrial motions. 
 On November 18, 2009, Mensah-Yawson requested additional time to file pretrial 
motions.
1
  The District Court granted his request and extended his time to file pretrial 
motions until December 18, 2009.  On January 11, 2010, Mensah-Yawson moved nunc 
pro tunc to extend the filing deadline to February 10.  He finally filed his three pretrial 
motions on February 19.  The government, after requesting and being granted additional 
time to respond, filed its response on March 12.  A hearing on the motions was not set at 
                                              
1
 Mensah-Yawson was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, and all 
relevant motions discussed in this opinion were filed by counsel. 
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the time because Mensah-Yawson‘s codefendants had also extended their pretrial motion 
filing deadlines past this time. 
A warrant was issued on June 3 for the arrest of codefendant Poole after he 
violated the conditions of his electronic monitoring.  At this time, Poole‘s extension of 
time for filing pretrial motions ran until July 2.  On June 4, Mensah-Yawson filed a 
Motion for Relief from Prejudicial Joinder in which he acknowledged that the STA clock 
would normally be tolled while the pretrial motions of all codefendants were pending.  
Mensah-Yawson argued that he was prejudiced by continuing to wait for his 
codefendants, who were on pretrial release and thus had no ―pressing interest in 
proceeding to trial quickly.‖  He requested that his case be severed and that a hearing be 
held on his pretrial motions.  Importantly, he only sought severance and did not argue 
that the case against him should be dismissed.  The government opposed Mensah-
Yawson‘s motion.2 
The District Court never formally ruled on the severance motion, presumably 
because subsequent events rendered severance unnecessary.  Greer pleaded guilty on 
June 15.  Poole appeared at his bond revocation hearing on July 22, and pleaded guilty on 
July 30.  Nicholas had obtained an extension to file her pretrial motions until September 
29, but notified the District Court of her intention to enter a guilty plea on September 17.  
She eventually did so on November 18. 
                                              
2
 The government noted that, if Poole was not brought back into custody by July 2, it 
would not object to the severance of Poole from Mensah-Yawson and codefendant 
Nicholas. 
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Mensah-Yawson‘s pretrial hearing was also held on October 21, and all pretrial 
matters were resolved.  The District Court scheduled the trial for November 15, and the 
government, without opposition, sought to continue the trial date because of witness 
unavailability.  On October 22, the motion was granted and the trial was set for 
December 13. 
Mensah-Yawson was found guilty by a jury on December 15, 2010.  At no point 
prior to trial did he seek dismissal of the charges on speedy trial grounds.  He was 
sentenced to time served with two year‘s supervised release,3 and ordered to pay 
restitution. 
II. 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We 
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
A. 
Mensah-Yawson argues that the delay between his indictment and the start of his 
trial violated the STA.
4
   The STA requires that the trial commence ―within seventy days 
from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the 
date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such 
                                              
3
 The supervised release is to start upon his release by immigration officials or upon his 
return to the United States.  The nature of the immigration charges are not clear from the 
record in this case, although Mensah-Yawson has not yet been removed. 
4
 Mensah-Yawson calculates that, before the start of his trial, he waited 456 days from 
the filing of the indictment, 421 days from the date he was arraigned, 223 days from 
when the government responded to his pretrial motions, and 139 days from when he 
requested severance from his codefendants.  These calculations do not take into account 
the many periods of time that would be excluded under the various tolling provisions of 
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h), as discussed below. 
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charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.‖  18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).  The STA 
provides for the dismissal of the indictment in cases where its provisions have been 
violated.  § 3162(a)(2).  Defendants ―must request this relief, however.‖  United States v. 
Register, 182 F.3d 820, 828 (11th Cir. 1999).  ―Failure of the defendant to move for 
dismissal prior to trial . . . shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this 
section.‖  18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). 
As noted, Mensah-Yawson did not move to dismiss the charges under the STA.  
By failing to do so, he waived his rights to pursue dismissal and thus did not ―preserve 
[his] statutory speedy trial claim for appellate review.‖  United States v. Littrice, 666 F.3d 
1053, 1059 (7th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Spagnuolo, 469 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 
2006) (―[A] defendant who fails to make a timely motion to dismiss based on a speedy 
indictment claim does not obtain the benefit of plain error review.‖).  Mensah-Yawson‘s 
argument that he satisfied the STA requirement with his motion to sever is incorrect.  His 
motion correctly identified the exclusions of time from the speedy trial computations 
applicable to his case—time while pretrial motions are pending, 18 U.S.C. § 
3161(h)(1)(D), and reasonable periods of time when a defendant is joined with 
codefendants, § 3161 (h)(6).  Mensah-Yawson recognized that, if the charges were 
severed, his codefendants would no longer be relevant for calculating his time under the 
STA.  To that end he sought to sever himself from his codefendants, arguing that joinder 
was prejudicial.  At no point, however, did he assert that his STA rights were violated, 
nor did he seek to have his charges dismissed on this ground. We therefore must conclude 
that he waived his claim. 
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Even assuming he had not waived his claim, there was no violation of his rights 
under the STA.
5
  Although roughly fifteen months passed between his arraignment and 
the start of the trial, Congress has decided that certain periods of time are not to be 
included in calculating the seventy-day period.  The two relevant periods of time that are 
not included for the purposes of this case are the ―delay resulting from any pretrial 
motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other 
prompt disposition of, such motion,‖ 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D), and a ―reasonable 
period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the 
time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted,‖  § 3161(h)(6).  
In particular, ―after defendants are joined for trial, an exclusion applicable to one 
defendant applies to all codefendants.‖  United States v. Arbelaez, 7 F.3d 344, 347 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Mensah-Yawson‘s clock started on October 20, 2009 when he was arraigned along 
with the last of his codefendants.  18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).  But, on that same day, the 
District Court granted Nicholas‘s motion to extend the time for filing pretrial motions, 
effectively tolling the speedy trial clock.
6
  See District Court Docket #43.  The District 
Court used the appropriate ―ends of justice‖ standard required by § 3161(h)(7) in granting 
the many extensions requested by Mensah-Yawson and his codefendants.  See Bloate v. 
United States, 130 S. Ct. 1345, 1355 (2010) (―Subsection (h)(7) provides that delays 
                                              
5
 ―We exercise plenary review over the district court's application of the [STA].‖ United 
States v. Willaman, 437 F.3d 354, 357 (3d Cir. 2006). 
6
 Mensah-Yawson, as well as Greer and Poole, also filed motions that would toll the 
clock shortly after this date. 
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‗resulting from a continuance granted by any judge‘ may be excluded, but only if the 
judge finds that ‗the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best 
interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial‘ and records those findings.‖).  
Thus the latest extension for filing pretrial motions, given to Nicholas on August 31, 
extending her filing deadline to September 29, applies to Mensah-Yawson as well.   
Nicholas‘s change in plea further tolled the speedy trial clock for the time between 
her announcing her intention to plead guilty, and her actual guilty plea on November 18, 
2010.  United States v. Barnes, 159 F.3d 4, 15 (1st Cir. 1998) (―[A]ll of the days between 
the date a codefendant files a motion for a change of plea and the date of the change of 
plea hearing itself are excludable from the [Act‘s] seventy-day time limit.‖ (citation 
omitted)); United States v. Jenkins, 92 F.3d 430, 440 (6th Cir. 1996) (―Since a change of 
plea is a motion requiring a hearing, the entire amount of time between [the change and 
the hearing] is excludable.‖).  The speedy trial clock was thus tolled through November 
18, the date that Nicholas pleaded guilty.   
Furthermore, the speedy trial clock was automatically tolled for the period relating 
specifically to the multiple pretrial motions that Mensah-Yawson filed  on February 19.
7
  
The hearing on these motions was not held until October 21.  Accordingly, these motions 
extended the excludable time to October 21.  Even more time is excludable after that 
date, as the government filed a motion seeking to postpone the trial from November 15 
because of witness conflicts.  Mensah-Yawson did not object, and the trial date was 
                                              
7
 Mensah-Yawson‘s initial request for additional time to file pretrial motions occurred on 
November 18, 2009, and was followed by his moving nunc pro tunc on January 11, 2010 
to extend the filing deadline into February. 
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moved to December 13.  This continuance made the time preceding trial excludable 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(A). 
When all of the above exclusions are taken into account, it is clear that Mensah-
Yawson‘s STA right to a trial within seventy days of his arraignment was not violated.  
We will deny his challenges to his conviction on this ground. 
B. 
Mensah-Yawson also argues that the delay preceding his trial violated the Sixth 
Amendment‘s guarantee of a ―speedy and public trial.‖  The failure of Mensah-Yawson 
to raise this argument below means we review his challenge for plain error.
8
  Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 52(b); see also United States v. Gearhart, 576 F.3d 459, 462–63 (7th Cir. 2009). 
When an appellant argues the government has violated his or her speedy trial 
rights, we employ the four-part balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 
92 (1972), to assess the merits of his or her claim. United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 
184 (3d Cir. 1998).  The Barker test requires that we evaluate the appellant's claim in 
light of ―[1] whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, [2] whether the 
government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, [3] whether, in due 
course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and [4] whether he suffered 
prejudice as the delay's result.‖  Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992) 
(citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).  ―None of these factors is ‗either a necessary or 
                                              
8
 To demonstrate plain error an appellant must show: ―(1) that there was an error, i.e., a 
deviation from a legal rule, (2) that the error was ‗plain,‘ i.e., clear or obvious, and (3) 
that the error affected his substantial rights.‖  United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 928 
(3d Cir. 2008). 
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sufficient condition,‘ and the factors ‗must be considered together with such other 
circumstances as may be relevant.‘‖  United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 
2009) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533).  If Mensah-Yawson‘s right to a speedy trial has 
been violated, we must dismiss the indictment.  Id. 
The first factor, the length of the delay, presents a threshold matter in which we 
must determine whether the delay warrants inquiry into all four factors.  Barker, 407 U.S. 
at 530 (―The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism.‖).  ―If the 
delay is relatively brief, then it is not necessary to consider the other Barker factors.‖  
Battis, 589 F.3d at 678.  ―If the delay is sufficiently long, courts assess the extent to 
which the delay was long enough to ‗intensify‘ the prejudice caused by the delay.‖  Id.  
This Court has previously determined that a fourteen-and-one-half month delay is 
sufficient to warrant inquiry into the other factors.  Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 760 
(3d Cir. 1993).  Given that Mensah-Yawson‘s delay was roughly fifteen months, we must 
weigh the Barker factors.
9
 
Regarding the first factor, ―the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the 
accused intensifies over time.‖  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652.  We must examine ―the 
peculiar circumstances of [each] case‖ in deciding what weight to give to the delay.  
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–31.  We do not find the roughly fifteen-month delay in this case 
sufficiently long to ―intensify‖ any prejudice it allegedly caused.  The case entailed 
                                              
9
 The time that Mensah-Yawson spent in the custody of Pennsylvania state authorities on 
similar charges does not affect our analysis.  Battis, 589 F.3d at 679 (―When an arrest on 
state charges is followed by a federal indictment, the right to a speedy trial in the federal 
case is triggered by the federal indictment, and the time period under consideration 
commences on that date.‖). 
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charges against four codefendants for conspiring to counterfeit securities.  ―[T]he delay 
that can be tolerated‖ for prosecuting a more complicated crime is obviously different 
than what can be tolerated ―for an ordinary street crime.‖  Id. at 531.  As a result, the first 
factor does not weigh in Mensah-Yawson‘s favor. 
Nor does the second factor.  Barker also tells us that the second factor, the reason 
for delay, is to be given different weight based upon the nature of the reason.  ―A 
deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted 
heavily against the government.‖  Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.  ―A more neutral reason such 
as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless 
should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest 
with the government rather than with the defendant.‖  Id.  ―Finally, a valid reason, such 
as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.‖  Id.  The government 
―bears the burden to justify the delay,‖ Hakeem, 990 F.2d at 770, and in this case it has 
done so.  Mensah-Yawson, as well as his codefendants, obtained a number of extensions 
for filing pretrial motions.  The government obtained only a one-month postponement of 
the trial to avoid a conflict for a government witness.  These are both appropriate 
justifications for the delay, and thus weigh against Mensah-Yawson‘s speedy trial claim. 
The third Barker factor (i.e., whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy 
trial) is the only one that weighs slightly in Mensah-Yawson‘s favor.  ―[A] defendant‘s 
claim that the right is being violated provides strong evidence that it actually was 
violated.‖  Battis, 589 F.3d at 681.  As discussed earlier, Mensah-Yawson‘s motion to 
sever under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 articulated a concern about the time it 
 11 
 
was taking for him to go to trial.  For the benefit of the District Court, he should have 
more clearly expressed his concerns or clearly raised them again within the six-month 
period between his motion to sever and the start of his trial.  Assuming, for the purpose of 
this appeal, that the filing of the motion to sever and its identification of speedy trial 
tolling concepts was sufficient under the Constitution, this factor would only weigh 
slightly in Mensah-Yawson‘s favor and would not be sufficient to overcome the other 
factors we must consider. 
The fourth and final Barker factor (i.e., prejudice to the defendant) is assessed ―‗in 
light of the interests . . . which the speedy trial right was designed to protect.‖  Battis, 589 
F.3d at 682 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).  A defendant can establish prejudice in 
two ways.  First, he can demonstrate that  ―he was subject to ‗oppressive pretrial 
incarceration,‘ that he suffered ‗anxiety and concern‘ about the impending trial, or that 
his defense was impaired as a result of the delay.‖  Id. (quoting Barker, 407 at 532).  
Second, he can claim prejudice without providing ―affirmative proof of particularized 
prejudice‖ if the delay is excessive.  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655.  Regarding this second 
route of presumptive prejudice, the Supreme Court has noted that ―its importance 
increases with the length of delay.‖  Id. at 656.  ―Given that ‗time's erosion of exculpatory 
evidence and testimony‘ can hinder a defendant's ability to prove that his defense was 
impaired by a delay,‖ federal courts ―‗generally have to recognize that excessive delay 
presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove 
or, for that matter, identify.‘‖  Battis, 589 F.3d at 682 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655–
66). 
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Mensah-Yawson argues that he was prejudiced by the fact that he ―was unable to 
substantially assist in his defense.‖   He also contends that the roughly fifteen-month 
delay gives rise to a presumption that prejudice exists.  We reject both arguments.  First, 
Mensah-Yawson has provided nothing from which we can gauge his claim that his 
pretrial confinement impaired his ability to assist in his defense.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized that ―impairment of one‘s defense is the most difficult form of speedy trial 
prejudice to prove because time‘s erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony ‗can 
rarely be shown.‘‖  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).  Despite 
the difficulty that some defendants may have in making this showing, we will not accept 
a ―blanket statement [that] gives no indication as to the content and relevance [of the lost 
assistance], and how its absence impaired‖ the defense in the case.  United States v. 
Harris, 566 F.3d 422, 433 (5th Cir. 2009).  Mensah-Yawson has only provided precisely 
this type of empty assertion, and thus has failed to demonstrate actual prejudice. 
Second, we have held that a delay of ―fourteen and one-half months . . . is 
insufficient to allow an inference of prejudice solely from the length of the delay.‖  
Hakeem, 990 F.2d at 764.  The delay in this case is nearly identical to that in Hakeem, 
and consequently we will not infer prejudice solely from the length of delay.    
Mensah-Yawson has thus failed to show prejudice that would tip the fourth factor 
in his favor.  Assuming that the third of the four Barker factors weighs slightly in favor of 
finding that Mensah-Yawson‘s right to a speedy trial was violated, the other three weigh 
against such a finding.  As a result, we conclude that Mensah-Yawson was not deprived 
of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. 
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III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Mensah-Yawson‘s judgment of 
conviction and sentence.  
 
